Competition for copper, lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite and rare earths is increasingly shaped by governments seeking to attract multiple sources of capital rather than align exclusively with either Western or Chinese supply chains. Producer countries are using their mineral resources to negotiate ownership structures, royalties, domestic processing requirements and infrastructure commitments.
Chile, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Bolivia and Indonesia are pursuing different forms of this approach, opening projects to foreign investors while retaining the ability to change fiscal, ownership and processing arrangements. Chinese state-owned companies, Western mining groups, Gulf sovereign funds, commodity traders and development-finance institutions are competing for projects.
Western critical-minerals coordination expands
The Western policy framework has become more structured, although national priorities remain different. The Minerals Security Partnership, established in 2022 by participating countries and the European Union, sought to coordinate investment in mining, processing and recycling. In February 2026, Washington announced FORGE as its successor, giving critical-minerals policy a stronger commercial and geopolitical focus. The United States is primarily targeting Chinese influence over refining and permanent magnets, while Japan prioritises stable supplies for automotive, battery and electronics manufacturers. Canada and Australia combine resource-security objectives with the interests of their mining industries. Germany, France and other European countries must also balance industrial demand with environmental permitting, human-rights requirements and supply-chain reporting.
The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, effective since May 2024, targets by 2030 domestic extraction equal to at least 10% of annual consumption, processing capacity of 40% and recycling capacity of 25%. The EU also aims to ensure that no more than 65% of any strategic raw material at a relevant processing stage comes from a single third country.
The European Commission selected 60 strategic projects in 2025, comprising 47 projects inside the EU and 13 in third countries and overseas territories. A second call received more than 160 applications, including 75 battery-material projects and 21 rare-earth projects linked to permanent magnets.
Strategic designation can accelerate permitting and improve access to European Investment Bank and EU financing channels, but projects still need to assemble equity, subordinated debt, construction guarantees and long-term offtake agreements individually.
China retains an integrated project model
BRICS does not operate as a unified minerals bloc. Its members—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia—have different resource bases and industrial priorities. China holds major positions in mineral processing and manufacturing, while India seeks to reduce Chinese supply-chain exposure. Brazil is seeking investment across lithium, nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths and niobium without granting exclusive access. South Africa wants greater value retention from platinum-group metals, manganese, chrome and vanadium, while Indonesia has used export controls to drive domestic nickel processing.
The New Development Bank has not become a common BRICS financing mechanism for mines, refineries or mineral corridors. The grouping also lacks a shared strategic-minerals list, common stockpile, joint purchasing system or unified tariff policy.
Chinese companies retain an advantage by combining construction, processing technology, equipment, infrastructure finance and long-term purchasing. This integrated approach allows them to pursue projects in jurisdictions where Western institutions may be more cautious because of political, regulatory or credit risks.
Chile uses competition to strengthen state participation
Chile’s National Lithium Strategy provides a clear example of a producer state maintaining flexibility. The government intends to retain a leading role in strategic salt flats while allowing private participation through public-private partnerships and independently promoted exploration.
Under the Codelco-SQM agreement for Salar de Atacama, Codelco is to hold 50% plus one share of the operating partnership. The structure provides majority state participation while retaining SQM’s operational experience. Chile’s approach allows European, Chinese, Japanese and South Korean investors to participate under different commercial advantages. European companies can offer access to premium markets and lower-carbon industrial chains, Chinese groups bring battery-market integration and rapid execution, while Japanese and South Korean investors provide automotive offtake relationships.
Brazil and Bolivia pursue flexible investment strategies
Brazil combines BRICS membership and extensive trade with China with efforts to attract investment from the EU, United States, Japan and Gulf states. Its mineral endowment includes niobium, graphite, nickel, lithium, rare earths, manganese, copper and bauxite. The policy challenge is moving beyond raw-material exports toward domestic separation, refining and advanced-material production. That requires reliable electricity, transport, industrial water, skilled labour and predictable licensing.
Bolivia demonstrates the difficulties of converting major lithium resources into commercial production. Its salt flats contain exceptionally large lithium resources, but difficult brine chemistry, infrastructure shortages, political intervention and uncertain economics have delayed development. La Paz has negotiated separately with Russian and Chinese companies while examining other partnerships. Commercial production still depends on pilot results, recovery rates, water management, power availability, export logistics and enforceable contractual protections.
Copperbelt governments seek infrastructure and processing gains
The Democratic Republic of Congo remains central to cobalt and increasingly important to global copper supply. Chinese-controlled companies including CMOC and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt hold significant mining and processing positions. Western governments are seeking greater involvement through development finance, offtake support and infrastructure initiatives. The proposed expansion of the Lobito Corridor, linking the Copperbelt through Angola to the Atlantic, is intended to provide an alternative export route for Congolese and Zambian minerals.
Zambia is simultaneously working with the EU, participating in the Lobito initiative and maintaining commercial ties with Chinese companies. Its priorities include increasing copper production, rehabilitating infrastructure and attracting capital to existing mines and new developments. Copper traded around $13,600 per tonne in London on 20 July 2026, supported by low inventories and firm Chinese import demand. Higher prices strengthen project valuations and government revenues but can also encourage changes to royalties, tax exemptions and state participation.
Zimbabwe and Indonesia expand domestic processing
Zimbabwe’s ban on exports of unprocessed lithium ore encouraged Chinese investors to establish concentrators and processing plants associated with assets including Sabi Star. The policy increased domestic capital expenditure, although processing facilities still require reliable power, reagents, water, logistics and sufficient throughput.
Indonesia’s nickel strategy has attracted tens of billions of dollars into nickel smelting, stainless steel and battery-material capacity through export restrictions and domestic-processing requirements. Foreign-controlled mining companies are also subject to progressive divestment toward Indonesian ownership, eventually requiring a majority local stake.
The policy has increased domestic value addition and expanded Indonesia’s position in battery materials. It has also contributed to higher global nickel supply, putting pressure on competing operations in Australia and New Caledonia. LME nickel was around $17,000 per tonne in July 2026, well below the extreme prices reached during the 2022 market disruption.
Project economics increasingly include political conditions
For mining companies, critical-minerals investment now requires more than traditional assumptions covering grade, recovery, production and commodity prices. Financial models must account for state participation, royalties, mandatory processing, domestic supply quotas, export duties, local-content requirements and stabilization clauses.
Domestic refining can significantly increase capital requirements while introducing construction and commissioning risks. Remote projects may additionally require dedicated power generation, transmission, roads, rail connections, ports, water infrastructure and worker accommodation.
These requirements widen the gap between geological resources and financeable reserves. Governments may view beneficiation as industrial development, while lenders face higher completion risks, uncertain operating costs and weaker debt-service coverage. Equity investors consequently require higher returns, while political-risk insurers may impose stricter conditions. Producer countries with credible institutions are better positioned to convert mineral competition into investment. Chile, Brazil, Botswana and Namibia have stronger prospects where legal frameworks and administrative processes are more predictable, while repeated permit suspensions, fiscal changes or politicised commercial disputes can make financial close more difficult.
A formal producer cartel remains unlikely because critical-mineral markets differ in grades, processing routes, end uses and substitution possibilities. High prices can also stimulate recycling, alternative chemistries and development of previously marginal deposits. The resulting market is increasingly decentralised. Western institutions continue to emphasise diversification, traceability and environmental performance; China retains strengths in processing, construction and integrated supply chains; while India, Japan, South Korea and Gulf states are expanding bilateral investment tied to manufacturing, energy security and portfolio objectives.
